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The modem trend toward binding commercial arbitration1 recently re-
ceived strong stimulus from the United States Supreme Court in Shearsoni
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.2 By transforming predispute securities
arbitration provisions from mere options to arbitrate, exercisable at the cus-
tomer's discretion, into binding and enforceable contracts, the Court's deci-
sion in McMahon will encourage the use of arbitration to resolve disputes
previously adjudicated in court.'
The significance of the McMahon decision to securities arbitration lies pri-
marily in the increased number of claims that now will be resolved through
arbitration.4 In holding that section 10(b)5 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (1934 Act)6 did not preclude enforcement of a valid arbitration pro-
vision, McMahon will assuredly prompt an increase in the number of securi-
1. Arbitration is a process whereby parties voluntarily refer their disputes to an impartial
third person, an arbitrator, selected by the parties. The arbitrator resolves the dispute based
on the evidence and arguments presented before the arbitral tribunal. It is a "contractual
proceeding whereby parties agree in advance that the tribunal's award will be final and binding
upon them." G. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (rev. ed. 1987). "Com-
pulsory or binding arbitration... occurs when the consent of one of the parties is enforced by
statutory provisions." R. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (1984).
This Comment will focus on binding commercial arbitration, as opposed to labor arbitra-
tion. In addition, the statutory enforcement mechanism focused upon here will be the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (FAA or the Act), not state arbitration statutes.
2. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). For a discussion of McMahon's impact in hastening the trend
toward arbitration of securities disputes, see Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (reasoning
that the likelihood of greater use of arbitration after McMahon prompted the Securities Ex-
change Commission's proposed modification of securities industry arbitration procedures); see
also Letter from Richard G. Ketchum (Director of Market Regulation Division, Securities
Exchange Commission) to all Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) members
(Sept. 10, 1987) [hereinafter SEC Letter].
3. See SEC Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
4. Id.; Shell, Arbitration After the Crash, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 21, 1988, at 13, col. I (discuss-
ing the impact of the Oct. 19, 1987 market crash on the volume of securities disputes resolved
in arbitration); see also Rodriguez De Quijous v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299
(5th Cir. 1988) (construing McMahon as also supporting compelled arbitration of claims aris-
ing under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982)); Staiman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (same).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
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ties disputes submitted to arbitration.7 Moreover, growth in the number of
securities disputes settled in arbitration promises to magnify problems with
and heighten concerns about the adequacy of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation.' Prominent among these concerns in the securities industry is the
unavailability of punitive damages in arbitration.9
The attractiveness of the arbitration alternative relates directly to its per-
ceived ability to protect investors' legal rights and remedies. 10 Furthermore,
the popularity of securities arbitration, and its usefulness as an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism depends largely upon the degree to which it
provides claimants with a comparatively expeditious and inexpensive alter-
native to litigation." However, to the extent that arbitral consideration ex-
cludes punitive awards, the process sacrifices both systemic efficiency and
investor protection.
Fraudulent conduct in securities transactions does not give rise to punitive
relief under federal securities law. 12 In contrast, most states allow punitive
damage awards for particularly outrageous conduct.13 Accordingly, to re-
cover exemplary awards for fraudulent securities transactions, claimants
often will join state fraud claims with causes of action under federal law. 4
When courts adjudicate such claims, the nature of the forum itself creates no
obstacle to recovery of punitive relief on the pendent state claim.' 5 Histori-
cally, however, submission of the same claims to an arbitral forum deprives
the plaintiff of the opportunity to recover punitive damages on the pendent
state claim.' 6 Thus, a mere change of forum, from court to arbitration, not
only alters the method of dispute resolution, but also restricts the recovery
available to the claimant and limits the defendant's exposure to liability.
To the degree that arbitration alters the combination of remedies and
sanctions afforded by state law, it modifies substantive law in ways unin-
7. See supra note 2.
8. See SEC Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
9. See generally D. DOBBs, HORNBOOK ON REMEDIES 470 (1973); Stipanowich, Punitive
Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REV. 953 (1986)
(discussing the history of punitive damage awards in arbitration and challenging the public
policy rationale denying such awards).
10. See R. RODMAN, supra note 1, at 3.
11. Id. at 3-4.
12. See 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5, § 260.03[e] (2d
ed. 1986). This Comment will focus exclusively on the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb (1982) [hereinafter Securities Act] and the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1982).
13. See Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 955 n.10.
14. Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agree-
ments for Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 709 (1980).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 223-70.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 176-88.
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tended by the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act) 7
and interferes with the contractual expectations of parties to an arbitration
agreement.' 8 Furthermore, depriving arbitral panels of the authority to im-
pose punitive sanctions on defendants guilty of outrageous and intentional
wrongdoing will render such behavior unpunishable through civil litigation.
Therefore, judicial exclusion of punitive damages from securities arbitration
arguably functions both as an unapproved amendment to the FAA and as an
impediment to effective private enforcement of the federal securities laws.
This Comment will begin with a brief overview of commercial arbitration,
focusing on the accelerating trend toward enforcement of securities arbitra-
tion agreements leading up to and culminating in the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in McMahon."' Next, it will examine the availability of punitive damage
awards and discuss their desirability when claimants join pendent state
claims in arbitration with claims arising under the federal securities laws.
Finally, this Comment will survey recent developments in securities arbitra-
tion and recommend changes consistent with the policies underlying both
the FAA and federal securities law.
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT
A. Legislative Creation and Judicial Expansion
American courts, like their English counterparts, traditionally viewed
predispute arbitration agreements with skepticism and hostility.2" To
counteract this judicial attitude, Congress enacted the FAA.2'
The FAA applies to a written arbitration provision contained in any con-
tract involving interstate commerce22 and places that contract "upon the
same [legal] footing as other contracts., 23 In addition, the FAA vests fed-
eral district courts with the authority to resolve issues associated with the
17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 40-43.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 292-300.
19. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
20. See generally Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Ar-
bitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393 (1987); Krause, supra note 14.
21. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). "The Arbitration Act sought to overcome the rule of equity, that
equity will not specifically enforce any arbitration agreement." Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (quoting Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 6 (1923) (statement of Sen. Walsh)).
22. 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 provides that written arbitration agreements contained in con-
tracts involving interstate commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds ... as exist ... for the revocation of any contract." Id.
23. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924)). Thus, the importance of contractual considerations becomes
manifest. Standard defenses to the enforcement of contracts in general, such as unconsciona-
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making of the arbitration agreement itself, or the enforcement thereof.24
Furthermore, the Act specifies the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitral
award.2 5 Thus, the FAA vests federal district courts with authority to dis-
pense court orders in three instances: to compel arbitration,2 6 to stay litiga-
tion pending arbitration,27 and to vacate an award granted in arbitration.28
Exercising its power of judicial review,29 the Supreme Court clarified and
arguably expanded3° Congress' legislative assertion in the years following
the FAA's enactment. In Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 3 1 the
Court affirmed the FAA's constitutionality 32 and proclaimed a federal dis-
trict court's substantive authority under the Act as extending into contract
law only over issues involving the making and performance of the arbitration
clause itself.
33
Effectively creating a presumption favoring arbitration, the Court in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 34 held that
the FAA established, "as a matter of federal law, [that] any doubts concern-
ing the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion.",35 Indeed, where the arbitration agreement represents a written clause
bility, apply to the arbitration provision itself, which is separable from the remainder of the
contract. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 4. "Section 4 provides a federal remedy for a party 'aggrieved by the al-
leged failure, neglect or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitra-
tion,' and directs the federal court to order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for
arbitration ... [was] made and ... not ... honored." Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 400.
25. 9 U.S.C. § 10. Because post-arbitration judicial examination of arbitral awards consti-
tutes one of the two contexts for evaluating the availability of punitive relief, the scope of
permissible court review becomes most significant. Under § 10, federal district courts may
vacate an award upon proof of misconduct, fraud, or corruption in procuring the award as well
as for failure to follow specified procedures. Id.
Absent misconduct, an arbiter's legal analysis or conclusions may form a basis for vacatur
only if such interpretation meets the judicially-created "manifest disregard" standard first ar-
ticulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). However, the Supreme Court's dis-
cussion in Wilko provides little assistance in applying the standard, and subsequent
interpretations similarly fail to define it precisely. See generally Lipton, The Standard on
Which Arbitrators Base Their Decisions: The SRO's Must Decide, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1988)
(discussing conflicting interpretations given the "manifest disregard" standard).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
27. Id. §4.
28. Id. § 10; see also supra note 25.
29. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
30. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. REV. 1305, 1305 (1985) (tracing development and expansion of the FAA, a process the
author refers to as its "federalization").
31. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
32. Id. at 405.
33. Id. at 404.
34. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
35. Id. at 24-25.
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within a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce, federal
law governs "construction of the contract language itself," including ques-
tions of waiver and other contractual defenses to arbitration. 6
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,37 the Court extended the application of the
Act into state courts, asserting the Act's dominance over contrary state law
by requiring such courts to enforce valid arbitration agreements, even where
state law specifically provided otherwise. 38 In Southland, the Court held
that a California law requiring judicial consideration of a particular statu-
tory claim directly conflicted with the FAA and was thus unenforceable
under the Supremacy Clause.39
Further manifesting its emphasis on enforcing arbitration provisions, the
Supreme Court held in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd 4 that the FAA
mandated arbitration of pendent state claims, even where costly bifurcated
proceedings ensued.4" In Byrd, the Court dismantled the practice of ob-
taining judicial consideration of otherwise arbitrable pendent state securities
claims by "intertwining" the latter with nonarbitrable causes of action aris-
ing under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).42 Because enforcement
of valid arbitration agreements represented the primary purpose of the FAA,
the Court's desire to give effect to that purpose surpassed its concerns about
undermining the subsidiary goals of the Act, and of arbitration generally:
less costly and more expeditious dispute resolution.43
Thus, by 1985, with the holding in Byrd, the Court resoundingly resolved
questions regarding the scope of the FAA in favor of its broad and liberal
application. Byrd demonstrated that Congress, through the FAA, had
achieved its goal of reversing centuries of judicial hostility toward enforce-
ment of predispute arbitration agreements. However, in the securities con-
text, courts still routinely denied motions to compel arbitration pursuant to
the Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan.
44
B. Arbitration and Investor Protection
Judicial hostility to arbitration, combined with considerations of statutory
construction and protection of investors45 led the Supreme Court in Wilko v.
36. Id. at 25.
37. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id.
40. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
41. Id. at 217.
42. Id. at 216-171; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb.
43. Id. at 217.
44. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
45. Id. at 434-38.
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Swan to refuse enforcement of an otherwise valid predispute arbitration
agreement.46 In Wilko, the Court confronted a dispute presenting a "not
easily reconcilable" conflict between the policies underlying the FAA and
those of the Securities Act.4 7
In Wilko, a customer of the defendant brokerage firm alleged violations of
section 12(2) of the Securities Act.4" The defendant, pursuant to section 3 of
the FAA, moved to stay trial pending arbitration.49 The district court de-
nied the stay, reasoning that the agreement deprived the buyer of his advan-
tageous civil remedy under the Securities Act. 5° Reversing the trial court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that
the Securities Act did not prohibit enforcement of the agreement. 51
The Supreme Court held that arbitration could not be compelled.52 The
majority's first rationale was statutory. The "special right" of recovery
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act manifested a congressional inten-
tion to protect investors.53 Section 14 of the Securities Act voids any "con-
dition, stipulation, or provision binding any person... to waive compliance
with any [of its] provision[s]." 54 Because the majority considered the arbi-
tration agreement a stipulation waiving compliance with the provision giving
the purchaser a right to select a judicial forum, section 14 rendered it void.55
Hence, according to the majority, the customer could not compel
arbitration.56
In addition to its statutory rationale, the Court expressed skepticism about
arbitration in general. Stating that the "effectiveness" of the Securities Act's
protections was "lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceed-
ings,"57 the Court considered the complexity of the statutory legal questions
46. Id. at 438.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 428; see also 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
49. Id. at 429.
50. Id. at 429-30.
51. Id. at 430.
52. Id. at 438.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). The Court considered the right of recovery under § 12(2) to be
"special" for the following reasons. First, recovery for misrepresentation is easier under
§ 12(2) than under the common law because under § 12(2) the seller has the burden of proving
lack of scienter. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. Second, the right is enforceable in any court, and
§ 12(2) prohibits removal from state court. Id. Third, the purchaser has a wide choice of
venue if the case is brought in federal court. Id. Fourth, nationwide service of process is
available to the purchaser. Finally, the minimum amount in controversy requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 does not apply. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77n.
55. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
56. Id. at 438.
57. Id. at 435.
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implicated in a securities action, and the fact that arbitrators lacked legal
training to resolve them."8 In addition, the Court expressed concern over
the severely limited nature of judicial review of arbitral decisions5 9 The
Court concluded that these factors handicapped disputants to such an extent
that, when added to the Court's statutory conclusions, congressional inten-
tion "concerning the sale of securities [would be] better carried out by hold-
ing invalid such an agreement." '
Following Wilko, lower courts extended its holding, denying compulsory
arbitration to claims under sections 5 and 17 of the Securities Act.6 ' Fur-
thermore, courts found implied causes of action under the 1934 Act not arbi-
trable.62  And, until recently, some courts refused to enforce predispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under section 10(b) 6 3 of the 1934 Act
and rule l0b-5, 6 promulgated thereunder. Although the Court had not ex-
pressly overruled Wilko, its rationale became the subject of close judicial
scrutiny beginning in 1974 with the Supreme Court's decision in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co. 
65
Scherk involved a rule lob-5 claim asserted in the context of an interna-
tional securities transaction. 66 The defendant sought a stay pending arbitra-
tion.67 The plaintiff opposed the stay, and moved to enjoin arbitration.
68
The district court granted plaintiff's injunction and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on Wilko.69
The Supreme Court reversed, holding Wilko inapposite.7" The Court dis-
tinguished Wilko on two grounds. First, unlike the contract in Wilko, the
agreement in Scherk resulted from arms-length negotiation by parties to an
international agreement.7 Second, the claim in Scherk arose under an im-
58. Id. at 435-36.
59. Id. at 436-37; see also supra note 25.
60. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
61. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 279,
297 (1984).
62. See, e.g., Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977);
see also Katsoris, supra note 61, at 297-98.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lob-5 (1987). Rule lOb-5 constitutes the most popular federal securi-
ties remedy available to claimants. Robbins, Securities Arbitration: Preparation and Presenta-
tion, ARB. J., June 1987, at 3, 6.
65. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
66. Id. at 509.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 509-10.
69. Id. at 510.
70. Id. at 517-18, 520-21.
71. Id. at 515 ("Such a contract involves considerations and policies significantly different
from those found controlling in Wilko.").
1988] 1119
Catholic University Law Review
plied cause of action under the 1934 Act rather than an express right of
action like that invoked in Wilko.7 Because the Court found the interna-
tional context of the dispute "crucial, ' 73 and the distinction drawn between
implied and express causes of action significant, 74 Scherk appeared to cast
doubt on the practice of refusing to compel arbitration of rule lOb-5 claims.
Undaunted by Scherk, however, lower courts attempted to limit its hold-
ing.73 By either reading it as applying solely to international transactions,76
or regarding its language distinguishing implied from express causes of ac-
tion as dictum, 77 courts refused to consider the possibility that Scherk ap-
plied to domestic section 10(b) cases. 7 ' Accordingly, lower courts and
commentators continued to consider rule lOb-5 claims nonarbitrable.79
The Court's increasingly hospitable attitude toward enforcing predispute
arbitration agreements in the securities context expanded the FAA gener-
ally.8 o Having previously established the supremacy of the FAA over state
law,8 1 pendent state statutory or common law securities claims clearly be-
came arbitrable.8 2 Therefore, when a party joined an arbitrable state claim
with a nonarbitrable federal securities claim, courts could either send both to
arbitration, send both to court, or sever the claims, sending one to court and
compelling arbitration of the other. The second of these options is com-
monly referred to as the doctrine of intertwining.
8 3
Because arbitration panels 4 and federal securities statutes foreclosed re-
covery of punitive damages, 5 the practice of intertwining pendent state
claims out of arbitration and into federal court became the sole method of
72. Id. at 513-14; see also infra note 74.
73. Scherk 417 U.S. at 515.
74. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 411. Professor Fletcher notes that the distinction drawn in
Scherk between actions implied from the 1934 Act and express causes of action in the Securi-
ties Act was a "basis for the holding, not obiter dictum." Id. This conclusion is supported
both by the Court's "colorable argument" that Wilko was inapplicable in the context of the
1934 Act and by its closing explanation describing the holding. Id. Thus, Scherk called into
question the applicability of Wilko to future, domestic § 10(b) claims.
75. Id. at 412-13.




80. See generally Hirshman, supra note 30.
81. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
83. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 414-15; see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 216-17 (1985).
84. Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 955-59.
85. See 5C A. JACOBS, supra note 12, § 260.03[e]; see also Krause, supra note 14, at 695-
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obtaining exemplary relief in securities litigation. This practice prolifer-
ated 6 until the Supreme Court held in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd 7
that district courts lacked discretion to deny enforcement of arbitration pro-
visions through intertwining." Both the majority opinion's emphasis on the
purpose and legislative history of the FAA, 9 and Justice White's concurring
opinion distinguishing Wilko,90 presaged circumscription of compulsory ar-
bitration, as articulated in Wilko."9
During the same term, the Supreme Court further restricted the grounds
for denying application of the FAA. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,92 the Court held an international agreement to ar-
bitrate claims arising under the Sherman Act enforceable.
93
Mitsubishi's relevance to compulsory arbitration under the federal securi-
ties acts arises because like Wilko,94 Scherk,95 and Byrd,96 it involved the
applicability of the FAA to "claims arising out of [federal] statutes designed
to protect a class to which the party resisting arbitration belongs."9 First,
the Court found in the FAA no "presumption against arbitration of statu-
tory claims.""8 Furthermore, the Court held that courts should enforce ar-
bitration agreements absent explicit congressional "intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." '99 The judicial
inquiry, then, involved an initial determination of whether the agreement
itself was sufficiently broad to include resolution of the statutory claims and
a secondary evaluation of "whether legal constraints external to the parties'
agreement foreclosed ... arbitration. ' '"" ° Finding no contractual obstacle in
the clause itself, nor any statutory impediment to arbitral resolution of the
antitrust claim, the Court enforced the arbitration provision. °1
86. Krause, supra note 14, at 709.
87. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
88. Id. at 218.
89. Id. at 219-21.
90. Id. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring).
91. See generally Comment, Arbitrating Civil RICO and Implied Causes of Action Arising
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 455, 475-91
(1987) (analyzing circuit court split and accurately anticipating the Supreme Court's holding
in McMahon).
92. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
93. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629; Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
94. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
95. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
96. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
97. 473 U.S. at 625.
98. Id
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The Court in Mitsubishi thus created the analytical framework for deter-
mining whether a federal statutory claim will prohibit arbitration. In addi-
tion, Mitsubishi disposed of several arguments traditionally invoked to deny
enforcement of securities arbitration provisions. First, the public interest in
enforcement of antitrust laws, arguably greater than that implicated in the
majority of securities cases, constituted an insufficient obstacle to enforce-
ment of the agreement.102 Second, the complexity of the legal and factual
issues involved in an antitrust suit did not mandate exclusion of such claims
from arbitration. 0 3 Indeed, with respect to an arbitrator's ability to handle
complex claims, the Court noted that "adaptability and access to expertise
are hallmarks of arbitration."" Finally, despite the punitive treble dam-
ages remedy, the Court enforced the international arbitration agreement. 0 5
Thus, although the Court did not address the relevance of its conclusions to
securities arbitration, it did rely heavily on those conclusions in its next ma-
jor decision affecting the enforceability of securities arbitration
agreements. 106
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 0o the Court decided
two issues regarding the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements
that divided the lower courts. 108 First, it held that claims arising under sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act were arbitrable under the parties' valid predispute
arbitration agreement."9 Similarly, it held that the agreement was enforcea-
ble as to plaintiffs' claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
102. Id. at 636; see also Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination
of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 503-11, 516-21 (1981). Professor Sterk
hypothesizes that the public policy defense to compelled arbitration should prevent enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements "only in... areas where legal rules are designed to protect the
interests of third parties or the public at large, and thus foster ends other than fairly resolving
the dispute between the parties .... Id. at 492-93. In the securities arena, Sterk found Wilko
to be based "primarily on recognition that arbitration clauses in securities sales agreements
generally are not freely negotiated" and that exceptions to the rule, such as the Scherk holding,
bolstered this conclusion. Id. at 520. He concluded that the Wilko Court's refusal to enforce
arbitration clauses had no relationship to the securities laws. Id. at 521.
103. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 635. In describing the nature of the remedy under § 15 of the Sherman Act, the
Court emphasized its remedial nature. Although it did recognize the provision's "important
incidental policing function," the Court found that "so long as the prospective litigant effec-
tively may vindicate it's statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will con-
tinue to serve both its remedial and deterrent functions." Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
106. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337 (1987).
107. Id. at 2332.
108. Id at 2335.




The respondents, customers of petitioner's brokerage firm, instituted the
litigation. "' The customers sued in federal court alleging state common law
infractions, as well as violations of RICO, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and
rule lOb-5. "2 The petitioner moved to compel arbitration under section 3 of
the FAA, relying on the predispute arbitration agreement.
1 3
Using the analytical structure developed in Mitsubishi, 114 the Supreme
Court in McMahon turned first to the question of whether the party seeking
to defeat application of the FAA had met its burden of demonstrating that
Congress intended to exempt claims arising under the 1934 Act and RICO
from the FAA's coverage."' The Court rejected petitioner's contention that
section 29 of the 1934 Act" 6 forbade waiver of the exclusive federal court
jurisdiction over the 1934 Act claims granted by section 27.117 Section 27
imposes no substantive statutory obligations with which persons must "com-
110. Id. at 2346; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter
RICO].
This Comment is limited to the question of the availability of punitive damages in arbitra-
tion when state claims are joined with causes of action arising under the federal securities laws.
See supra note 1. Thus, the arbitrability of RICO claims is beyond the scope of this analysis,
except to the extent that the Court unanimously held that the punitive treble damages remedy
available under RICO did not impede arbitration of such claims. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at
2345. In holding RICO claims arbitrable, the Court relied heavily on Mitsubishi and its hold-
ing with respect to claims under § 4 of the Clayton Act, after which RICO was modeled. Id.
Using the analytical approach set forth in Mitsubishi, the Court examined the RICO statute to
determine whether its text, legislative history, or purpose evidenced congressional intent to
prohibit arbitration of claims brought under the statute. Id. at 2343-46. Finding no such
intention, the Court held the RICO claims arbitrable. Id. at 2346. Thus, McMahon and Mit-
subishi represent two instances in which the Supreme Court expressly allowed arbitral consid-
eration of punitive sanctions.
111. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2336.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
115. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337-38. Mitsubishi dictates this analytical approach. See
supra text accompanying notes 92-101. The McMahon majority's formulation of this analysis
placed "[t]he burden ... on the party opposing arbitration ... to show that Congress intended
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." McMahon, 107 S.
Ct. at 2337. The party resisting arbitration must identify this intention in the "text, or legisla-
tive history ... or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purposes." Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). Section 29 "declares void any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision" of the 1934 Act. Mc-
Mahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)). In rejecting respondents' theory
that, because predispute arbitration agreements are not freely negotiated, § 29 voids them, the
Court noted that "[t]he voluntariness of the agreement is irrelevant to the [§ 29] ... inquiry."
Id. at 2339. Thus, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that Wilko and its progeny are
premised on overreaching principles. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. Section 27 grants United States district courts exclusive jurisdiction
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ply," but merely grants jurisdiction over the 1934 Act claims to the federal
courts.' 8 Thus, the arbitration agreement did not constitute an agreement
to waive "compliance" with section 27.1"9
The Court described Wilko as a product of that Court's "belief that a
judicial forum was necessary to protect substantive rights created by the Se-
curities Act."' 120 Thus, "because arbitration was judged inadequate to en-
force the statutory rights created by section 12(2)," the Court in Wilko held
the arbitration clause void as a waiver of substantive rights.' 2' Furthermore,
the majority found support for this reading of Wilko in its prior holding in
Scherk 122
According to Justice O'Connor, the decision in Scherk "turned on [that]
Court's judgment that ... arbitration was an adequate substitute for adjudi-
cation."123 Thus, Wilko bars waiver of a judicial forum "only where arbitra-
tion is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue."'
124
The majority continued to focus on what it considered to be the "heart" of
the Court's decision in Wilko: that arbitration "weaken[s]" claimants' abil-
ity to recover. 125 The Wilko majority's evaluation of the efficacy of arbitra-
tion was not based on "evidence" or "facts of which [it could] take judicial
notice," but on a "general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration" and
the "competence of arbitral tribunals."' 126 Moreover, in light of the Supreme
Court's expressions of confidence in arbitration since Wilko 127 and because
of putative improvements in arbitration procedures and Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) oversight, ' 28 the assumptions regarding arbitration prev-
alent at the time of Wilko "do not hold true today."'
129
The majority dispensed with the respondents' final contention: that con-
over violations of the 1934 Act and over "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by [the] chapter." Id.





122. Id. at 2338-39.
123. Id at 2339.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2340.
126. Id. (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
127. Id. (citing generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
128. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341 (noting the increased oversight authority of the SEC).
But see infra text accompanying notes 142-48.
129. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
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gressional failure to reject the extension of Wilko to section 10(b) claims
constituted tacit legislative acceptance of such a practice.' 3° By failing to
reject judicial extension of Wilko during extensive revision of the 1934
Act,13 ' respondents argued that Congress thereby expressed its intention
that section 29(a) should continue to be interpreted as voiding otherwise
valid predispute arbitration agreements.' 32  However, Justice O'Connor
stated that because the primary goal of the amendments was to "preserve the
self-regulatory role of the securities exchanges," Congress did not address
whether section 10(b) claims could be arbitrated. 33 Therefore, the 1975
amendments did not affect the holding in Wilko, and the majority divined no
congressional intent to "bar enforcement of all predispute arbitration
agreements." 1
34
The dissent concurred that RICO claims were arbitrable but dissented
with respect to causes of action under section 10(b). 135 Justice Blackmun,
writing for the dissenters, focused on what the majority found to be the
"heart" of Wilko and what he considered both decisive to and defective in
the majority opinion: its view of the adequacy of arbitration procedures in
protecting investors' rights.
1 36
Justice Blackmun first disputed the majority's failure to find in the 1934
Act, with its primary goal of investor protection, an expression of congres-
sional intent to bar application of the FAA. ' 3 7 Contending that the majority
misread Mitsubishi, the dissent argued that the latter stood for the proposi-
tion that "the Securities Act constituted an exception to the Arbitration
Act."' 138 In addition, Justice Blackmun found Wilko not based on mistrust
of arbitration, but on the "express language, legislative history, and purposes
of the Securities Act."' 139 Conceding that the adequacy of arbitration repre-
sented one ground for the holding in Wilko, Justice Blackmun emphasized
that discussion of that element came after the Court had already concluded
130. Id. at 2343.
131. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
132. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2342-43.
133. Id. at 2342.
134. Id at 2343.
135. Id. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Bren-
nan & Marshall, JJ.).
136. Id. at 2349-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[wihere the Court first goes wrong, however,
is in its failure to acknowledge that the Exchange Act, like the Securities Act, constitutes" an
exception to the FAA).
138. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2351 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that the Securities Act was an exception to the FAA."0 Because both the
Securities Act and the 1934 Act have the "same basic goal," Justice Black-
mun concluded that Wilko's rationale should also apply to section 10(b)
claims to prevent compelled arbitration.
1 4
1
Next, the dissent disputed the majority's optimistic assessment of the abil-
ity of arbitration to protect investors' statutory rights and questioned the
adequacy of SEC oversight. 142 The characteristics of arbitration which the
Wilko court found problematic remained.' 4 3 In reviewing the changes in
arbitration since Wilko, the dissent noted that the SEC-the body charged
with oversight of securities arbitration-previously took the position that
"10(b) claims.., should not be sent to arbitration, that predispute arbitra-
tion agreements, where the investor was not advised of his right to a judicial
forum, were misleading," and that "the... oversight upon which the Com-
mission now relies could not alone make securities industry arbitration ade-
quate."'" Furthermore, even after the 1975 amendments, the SEC
continued to find such agreements misleading and possibly actionable under
the securities laws."' In addition, the SEC still lacked the authority to re-
view specific arbitration proceedings.' 4 6 Moreover, Justice Blackmun sug-
gested that SEC oversight may even decrease due to its limited resources and
because of currently high market activity.' 4 7 Finally, given the established
practice in the lower courts of refusing to enforce compulsory predispute
arbitration provisions with respect to the 1934 Act claims, any changes in
that practice should come from the legislature, not the judiciary. 4 '
C. Federalized Securities Arbitration
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FAA have "federalized" arbi-
tration questions. 149 The Act applies to all written arbitration agreements
evidencing a transaction in commerce and applies equally in state courts. 5 0
140. Id. at 2352 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2353-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2356 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2357 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun briefly discussed Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 15c-2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-2-2 (1987). This rule, re-
scinded in the aftermath of McMahon, see infra note 303, prohibited the use of predispute
arbitration agreements purporting to bind investors to arbitrate future disputes. McMahon,
107 S. Ct. at 2356 n.21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2356 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2359 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. See Hirshman supra note 30.
150. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1984).
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Further, where state law or policy conflicts with the policies underlying the
Act, the latter controls.'' Even efficiency, one of the primary justifications
for alternative dispute resolution in general, may not impede effectuation of
the FAA's preeminent goal: enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.
352
Finally, neither the existence of a broad federal statutory framework, nor
such framework's provision of punitive relief, necessarily constitute an ex-
ception to the FAA sufficient to deny its application.
53
In McMahon, the Court asserted that arbitration procedures are suffi-
ciently protective of a claimant's 1934 Act rights to compel arbitration of
claims asserting those rights.' 5 4 Thus, McMahon will probably transfer the
majority of rule lOb-5 claims and, therefore most securities cases, from the
federal courts to arbitral tribunals. 5' Given the Byrd Court's elimination of
the practice of intertwining pendent state claims to nonarbitrable federal
claims, the expansive reach of the FAA, and the general prohibition against
punitive awards in arbitration, punitive relief in securities disputes may be-
come a thing of the past. Although the Supreme Court has not considered
whether arbitration under the FAA would permit punitive damage awards
in such proceedings, a denial of punitive damage awards arguably interferes
with arbitration's function of providing a substantially equivalent forum for
dispute resolution' 56 and the securities statutes' broad goal of investor pro-
tection.'57 Finally, denial of punitive damages in arbitration might weaken
deterrence of already "outrageous" conduct on Wall Street by reducing or
eliminating potential exposure to punitive liability.
II. ARBITRAL AWARDS
Courts generally award punitive damages 5 ' to deter, punish, and provide
monetary incentive to bring suit against defendants engaging in outrageous
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
154. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343 (1987).
155. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
156. Throughout the majority opinion in McMahon, the Court stressed the adequacy of
arbitration in protecting claimants' statutory rights. 107 S. Ct. at 2339-41. Adequacy here
refers to the degree to which the arbitration forum protects parties' substantive rights. Id. at
2339. Thus, if submission of a claim to an arbitral forum proceeding deprives parties of a
remedy available in court, solely because of the nature of the forum, arbitration would presum-
ably become an inadequate substitution for litigation.
157. See, e.g., McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Easter-
brook & Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. Cm1. L. REV. 611, 611 n. 1 (1985)
(listing various damages recoverable under particular provisions of the securities laws).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977).
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conduct.' 59 Although courts have variously denominated the state of mind
necessary to justify a punitive award, 'I all require a culpable mental state
combined with outward misconduct.
16'
The existence of the requisite mental state and misconduct does not entitle
a successful plaintiff to such an award as a matter of right, but merely vests
in the trier of fact discretion to grant it.'62 Further, having granted the judi-
cial trier of fact authority to award punitive damages, appellate review of
such factual determination necessarily becomes limited. 163 Thus, the role of
the trier of fact, whether exercised by judge or jury, is crucial and often
determinative of punitive damage questions.
In arbitration, the arbitral tribunal replaces the traditional judicial trier of
fact. Given the severely limited scope of judicial review of arbitral awards,
remedies granted in arbitration are usually final.'" Accordingly, attacks on
punitive damage awards focus primarily on the scope of the parties' arbitra-
tion agreement 16 or the public policy goals generally underlying arbitration
159. Id. § 908(2).
160. D. DOBBS, supra note 9, at 205 (listing various judicial descriptions of requisite mental
states).
161. Id.
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment d (1977).
Whether to award punitive damages and the determination of the amount are within
the sound discretion of the trier of fact .... On the other hand, the trier of fact is not
required to award punitive damages in a case in which they are permissible, and it is
error for a trial judge to instruct the jury that punitive damages must be given.
Id.
163. Id. "The excessiveness of punitive damages... may be ground for reversal, for a new
trial, or for remittur .... " Id.; see also D. DOBBS, supra note 9, at 218.
164. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2354 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (listing statutory grounds under the FAA for vacating an arbitral award as well
as the judicially-created "manifest disregard" standard for evaluating arbitrators' legal analy-
sis); see also supra note 25.
165. An attack on the scope of the arbitration agreement itself is fundamentally a contrac-
tual argument in which one party contends that the agreement did not contemplate submission
of punitive damage questions to arbitration. However, the typical arbitration agreement states
that any dispute arising in connection with the business of the [broker] shall be arbitrated.
UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION § 12 (National Association of Securities Dealers 1987)
[hereinafter Code]; see also Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F.
Supp. 353, 355 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 169 (11 th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 823 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
None of these arbitration forms specifically excludes consideration of a particular remedy or
cause of action. On the contrary, the rules governing arbitration in the construction industry
empower arbitrators to "grant any remedy or relief which is just and equitable and within the
terms of the agreement of the parties." Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 357 (quoting CONSTRUC-
TION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULE 43). Unlike the construction industry rules, however,
the Securities Industry Uniform Code gives arbitrators no guidance with respect to the sub-
stantive nature of the award. See Code § 41.
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and punitive sanctions. 16 6
A. Arbitration Procedures in the Securities Industry
Parties to a securities arbitration agreement may consent to resolve future
disputes under the auspices of either the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) or securities industry Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs).' 67 .
Most securities arbitration proceedings are conducted under SRO proce-
dures as codified in the Uniform Code of Arbitration (Code). 16 ' Developed
and adopted pursuant to SEC encouragement, the Code represents an at-
tempt to standardize arbitration procedures in the securities industry.' 69
Unlike arbitration under AAA supervision, however, SRO arbitration rules
and practices remain nominally subject to SEC oversight. 170  Finally,
although it lacks authority to overturn a particular award, the SEC does
conduct periodic inspections of SRO arbitration files and investigates cus-
tomer complaints about individual proceedings.
17 1
The Code requires the SRO conducting the arbitration to appoint arbitra-
tors, a majority of whom must be from outside the securities industry.
172
The Code contains further procedures designed to ensure the impartiality of
the tribunal. 173 In:addition, the Code allows retention of legal representa-
166. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d
831 (1976). For a more in-depth analysis of the public policy overlay to arbitrability questions,
see generally Sterk, supra note 102 and Stipanowich, supra note 9.
167. Robbins, supra note 64, at 4. On September 1, 1987 the American Arbitration Associ-
ation's recently adopted arbitration rules, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULEs (American Ar-
bitration Assoc. 1988), tailored to the special needs of the securities industry, became effective.
Friedman, AAA's New Securities Arbitration Rules, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8, 1987, at 1, col. 1. In
addition, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in McMahon, the SEC recently proposed
major alterations in existing securities industry arbitration procedures. See supra note 2. The
suggested revisions are necessary because "SRO-sponsored arbitration may become the pri-
mary forum for the resolution of disputes between broker-dealers and investors." SEC Letter,
supra note 2, at 1-2 (emphasis added). Further, changes are necessary to increase public confi-
dence in arbitration, to facilitate SEC oversight of arbitration and to enable Self-Regulatory
Organizations (SROs) to more effectively handle complex cases. Id.
168. In 1986, disputants filed 2,850 cases with securities industry SROs, which adhere to
the Code procedures. In the same time period, the American Arbitration Association received
only 303 securities filings. Robbins, supra note 64, at 4-5.
169. Katsoris, supra note 61, at 283.
170. Robbins, supra note 64, at 5. For a critique of SEC oversight, see Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346-59 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The SEC proposal to change arbitration rules was prompted to a considerable degree by the
SEC's desire to more effectively oversee securities industry arbitration, which Justice Black-
mun found inadequate. SEC Letter, supra note 2, at 1-2.
171. Robbins, supra note 64, at 5.
172. Katsoris, supra note 61, at 285. The SEC proposal advocates drastic changes in the
composition and selection of arbitral panels. SEC Letter, supra note 2, at 2-7.
173. Katsoris, supra note 61, at 286.
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tion, permits use of certain limited discovery procedures, and specifies per-
missible pleading practices. 174 Finally, it grants arbitrators broad discretion
in evidentiary matters and requires recordation of the proceedings upon
request. 175
B. Obstacles to Punitive Damage Awards in Arbitration
The most significant obstacle to punitive damage awards in arbitration
remains the public policy rationale as articulated in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc. 176 In Garrity, a dispute arose between an author and the publisher of
her books.177 The publishing agreements between the parties contained
broad-form arbitration clauses.' The author obtained an arbitral award
including punitive damages, and moved for its judicial confirmation. The
publisher appealed, arguing that private arbitrators lack the authority to dis-
pense punitive sanctions.'
7 9
In sweeping language, the majority vacated the arbitral award of punitive
damages as against public policy.' 0 The majority stressed that a punitive
award is essentially a "social exemplary" remedy used to discourage and
punish "public" wrongs.' 8 ' As such, allowing arbitrators to grant punitive
damages would violate one "purpose of the rule of law," the requirement
that "the use of coercion be controlled by the State."' 2 This principle
174. Robbins, supra note 64, at 5-6. The SEC proposal would expand current discovery
practice by codifying the presently informal discovery procedures, using prehearing confer-
ences and preliminary hearings for large cases, and permitting limited use of depositions. SEC
Letter, supra note 2, at 10.
175. Katsoris, supra note 61, at 286. The SEC proposal recommends amending the Code
to provide a "sufficient record for appellate courts to use for their review." SEC Letter, supra
note 2, at 8. This record would be particularly useful when courts consider vacating an award
under the developing "manifest disregard" standard. See supra note 25.
The proposal also recommends including a summary of certain information regarding arbi-
tral awards, including relief sought and granted, in order to "balance out the inherently une-
qual familiarity with the system of investors and member firms." SEC Letter, supra note 2, at
8. If adopted, this provision would bring the question of punitive damages to the forefront. In
subsequent review of an award for punitive damages granted on a common law fraud claim
joined with a federal securities action, the reviewing court will be directly confronted with the
issues dealt with by this Comment.
176. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976); see also Note, Arbitration:
The Award of Punitive Damages as a Public Policy Question: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 43
BROOKLYN L. REV. 546 (1976). See generally Stipanowich, supra note 9.
177. 40 N.Y.2d at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
178. Id., 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
179. Id., 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
180. Id. at 360, 353 N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
181. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
182. Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (citing H. KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 21 (1945)).
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would govern even if the parties had specifically agreed to arbitral considera-
tion of punitive damage issues. 83
First, "permitting an arbitrator whose selection is often restricted or ma-
nipulatable ... to award punitive damages ... displaces... the [s]tate, as the
engine for imposing a social sanction."' 84 Second, because judicial review is
strictly limited, judicial supervision is usually unavailable to ensure the rea-
sonableness of the arbitral award.' 85 Finally, because arbitrators have no
practical guidelines to inform their decisions, the basis of the exemplary
damage determination consists of "subjective criteria involved in attitudes
toward correction and reform." Courts, therefore, should not entrust this
evaluation to private arbitrators.
86
The dissent reached a contrary conclusion, finding the three-pronged anal-
ysis of a prior case applicable to justify imposition of a penal sanction. 87
After finding these criteria satisfied, the dissent concluded that courts should
not intervene here, but only where the "public interest clearly supersedes the
concerns of the parties."'
' 88
An emerging common law trend,'89 as well as a significant number of
commentators, forcefully challenges the holding in Garrity. '90 The most
comprehensive judicial rejection of its holding and rationale to date came in
Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima International, Inc. 1' Wil-
183. Id. at 357, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
184. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
185. Id., 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (quoting Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper
& Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 A.D. 500, 503, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1952)).
186. Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (quoting Publishers' Ass'n v.
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union 280 A.D. 500, 503, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1952)).
187. Id. at 362-63, 353 N.E,2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 836 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (citing
Matter of Associated Gen. Contractors, N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 957, 959, 353
N.E.2d 859, 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (1975)). Judge Gabrielli found the following factors
sufficient to allow imposition of a punitive award: presence of a broad-form arbitration clause,
absence of third party interests, and lack of legislative articulation of a policy against punitive
damages. Id. at 363, 353 N.E.2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 365, 353 N.E.2d at 800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). This is
roughly equivalent to the framework posited by Professor Sterk. See supra note 102.
189. See Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 957 n. 15 (compiling cases). Among the more recent
cases recognizing arbitral imposition of punitive damages in a commercial context are: Wil-
loughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 360 (N.D. Ala. 1984),
aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (contractual dispute in construction industry); Willis v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (securities fraud claim);
Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 28-29, 331 S.E.2d 726, 734 (1985) (con-
tractual dispute in construction industry); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 631, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 676, 684 (1984) (medical malpractice claim).
190. See, e.g., Stipanowich, supra note 9; see also Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1360-63;
Sterk, supra note 102, at 527-33.
191. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
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loughby involved a dispute arising from a contractor's cancellation of a con-
struction contract that contained a broad-form arbitration provision. 192
Alleging several common law tort and contract claims, the subcontractor
brought suit in Alabama state court. 193 The contractor removed to federal
court and entered a motion for a stay pending arbitration.194 Following an
arbitral award against it, the defendant sought vacatur of the punitive dam-
age element of the award. 195 The court denied the contractor's motion and
confirmed the arbitral award.
196
The court's opinion rejected the Garrity rationale upon which the contrac-
tor's arguments rested.' 97 The contractor first contended that the arbitra-
tion clause itself was too narrow to empower arbitrators to award punitive
damages.' 9 ' While noting that the parties could have expressly restricted
the arbitrators' authority, 9 9 the district court followed the Supreme Court's
admonition to construe the agreement by "resolving all doubts in favor of
the arbitrator's authority."'" The court considered this principle especially
relevant with respect to the authority of the arbitrators to flexibly fashion
appropriate remedies. 20 1 Thus, the FAA's policy of resolving, in favor of
arbitration, doubts as to both the scope of arbitrable issues and the breadth
of arbitrators' remedial authority mandated rejection of defendant's conten-
tion that the contract involved in Willoughby precluded a punitive damage
award.
202
The court next confronted the proposition that public policy concerns
prohibit arbitral consideration of punitive awards. 20 ' First, the court noted
that the rationale in Garrity derived from state, not federal, law and pol-
icy. 2" Because the FAA applied to "written contract[s] evidencing a trans-
action in interstate commerce," federal law governed not only the categories
of claims subject to arbitration but also the "resolution of issues concerning
the arbitration provision's interpretation, construction, validity, revocability
192. Id. at 355.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 356.
196. Id. at 365.
197. Id. at 356.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 357.
200. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
(1983)).
201. Id. at 357.
202. Id. at 358-59.




and enforceability."2"5 Therefore, only conflicting federal policy or legisla-
tion could defeat the validity of an otherwise valid agreement to arbitrate.2°
Finding no federal policy prohibiting punitive damages, the court upheld the
arbitrator's award.2 °7
The court's examination of federal policy regarding punitive damages di-
rectly challenged the rationale of Garrity. First, the arbitrator's authority
derived from the parties' agreement. 20 8 That contract, like most commercial
arbitration agreements, broadly covered all disputes arising from the con-
tract.2° Clearly, plaintiff's tort claims related to the parties' construction
contract, and claims of fraudulent conduct, except in procurement of the
arbitration provision itself, were arbitrable.2" ° Because the panel possessed
the authority to resolve the tort claim, denying it the ability to grant a tradi-
tional remedy for such a claim would be "anomalous.,
21 1
The final segment of the Willoughby opinion focused on the deleterious
results that might flow from a per se rule denying punitive damages in arbi-
tration.2 2 First, restricting an arbitrator's flexibility would "undermine the
value and sufficiency of the arbitral process." '213 While recognizing that ar-
bitrators might abuse their authority, the court concluded that such a pos-
siblity did not justify denying punitive damages in all circumstances.21 4
Second, because arbitrators are by nature familiar with the practices in the
industry in which the dispute arises, they are at least as competent as a court
in identifying "outrageous" commercial practices and in determining what
amount of punitive damages would suffice to deter or punish such behav-
205. Id. at 359 (quoting Willis v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 823-24
(M.D.N.C. 1983)); see also supra note 22.
206. Willoughby; 598 F. Supp. at 360.
207. Id. at 361. "[T]here [is] 'no public policy reason persuasive enough to justify prohibit-
ing arbitrators from resolving issues of punitive damages submitted by the parties.' " Id.
(quoting Willis v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983)). In
Willis, the court compelled arbitration of securities claims over the plaintiff's objection that
the agreement did not encompass fraud claims or the prayer for punitive relief. Willis v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 822, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983). The court first
determined that the arbitration clause, covering "any controversy," encompassed not only the
tort claims, but also the prayer for punitive relief. Id. at 824. Finding no federal policy against
arbitral consideration of the punitive damage question, the court compelled arbitration. Id. at
825.
208. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 357.
209. Id. at 355.
210. Id. at 356 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967)).
211. Id. at 362.
212. Id. at 362-65.
213. Id. at 363.
214. Id. at 362.
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ior.215 Barring arbitrators from awarding damages commensurate with how
they, as experts, measure the gravity of the wrong, would prevent them from
applying their special expertise, the basis of their selection.21 6 Moreover,
considering an agreement to arbitrate a waiver of the plaintiff's right to pu-
nitive damages 217 would thwart the purposes of punitive awards and en-
courage "grossly unjustified conduct ... by making it more economically
feasible." '218 Finally, adherence to the Garrity rule would require twin pro-
ceedings where parties joined tort and contract claims.2" 9
Willoughby articulates the proposition that federal policy is the only rele-
vant consideration in determining whether punitive relief is allowable under
the FAA.220 Because the Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v.
Keating221 precludes state policy impediments from restricting the operation
of the FAA, obstacles to arbitration must be of federal magnitude.222
C. Remedies Available Under Federal Securities Law
In judicial fora, punitive damage awards are not available in causes of
action arising under express liability provisions of the federal securities
acts.223 Moreover, courts prohibit such awards in causes of action implied
from those provisions.224 However, exemplary awards are available in court
when litigants join pendent state claims with federal claims where the under-
lying state law so provides. 225 Given the likelihood that the majority of fu-
ture securities disputes will attain resolution in arbitral fora,226 the
availability of punitive remedies in arbitration represents a crucial issue in
the securities industry.
Most securities arbitration provisions evidence a transaction in interstate
commerce and, thus, become enforceable under the FAA.227 In determining
215. Id. at 363.
216. Id.
217. Id. In Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D.
I11. 1981), the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that their arbitration agreement with the
defendant was unconscionable because its enforcement would result in "forefeiture" of their
"right" to punitive damages. The court held that by agreeing to have New York law govern
the agreement, they "contractually waived their 'right' to punitive damages." Id.
218. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 363.
219. Id. at 364.
220. Id. at 365; see also Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1360-63.
221. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
222. Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1360-63.
223. 5C A. JACOBS, supra note 12, § 260.03[e].
224. Id.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 259-63.
226. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
227. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 401.
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the arbitrability of a given issue, the FAA resolves all doubts in favor of
enforcing the arbitration provision.228 A similar presumption favors grant-
ing arbitrators broad remedial authority, commensurate with the cause of
action before them.229 Moreover, only "clear and express [federal] exclu-
sions" should restrict arbitration of a given cause of action and arbitrators'
authority to remedy it.23
Clearly, state policy impediments, such as a rule prohibiting arbitral con-
sideration of punitive damage claims, are insufficient to deny arbitration.
2 31
In addition, although punitive awards remain unavailable for causes of ac-
tion arising under the federal securities acts,232 the United States Supreme
Court has not faced the question of whether the federal policy denying puni-
tive damage awards under the federal securities laws would apply to pendent
state claims joined in an arbitral forum.
To resolve this question, the goals of the implicated federal cause of action
must be examined.233 The general purposes of the federal securities laws are
to protect investors2 34 and maintain market efficiency.
235
Courts denying punitive damages under the federal securities acts gener-
ally do so as a matter of statutory construction and federal policy, both of
which involve an analysis of congressional intent.2 36 Section 28(a) of the
1934 Act, which limits recovery in private actions to "actual damages,"
withholds punitive damages from claimants alleging a violation of express or
implied provisions.
2 37
228. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 214-19.
230. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 358 (N.D.
Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Willis v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 823 (M.D.N.C. 1983)).
231. See Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1360-63.
232. See Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 157, at 611 n.l. (cataloging available remedies).
233. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2338 (1987).
234. Id. at 2353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 157, at 613. Professor Fischel and Judge Easter-
brook submit the damage provisions of the federal securities laws to economic analysis (the
"economics of sanctions"). Id. at 612. They evaluate damage rules in terms of their effective-
ness in deterring unwanted behavior without imposing undue costs on the market through
unwarranted deterrence or excessive enforcement costs. Id. Though some offenses may be
"efficient" in that their commission, and the resulting payment of damages may produce an
optimal allocation of resources, intentional torts should be unconditionally deterred by puni-
tive damage awards. Id. at 622.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). In pertinent part, § 28(a) states: "the rights and remedies
provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may
exist in law and equity but no person ... shall recover ... a total amount in excess of his actual
damages." Id.
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In Green v. Wolf Corp.,238 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected the contention that punitive damages were available
for an implied cause of action under rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act.23 9 Finding
"little aid in the legislative history" of section 28(a), the court sought to
construe the provision to effectuate its purpose.2 °
First, the court found no support in the 1934 Act for plaintiff's contention
that the implied cause of action should have "all of the attributes of common
law fraud.",24 ' Because imposition of liability under rule 10b-5 went "be-
yond the limits of the common law," the court found that equation of the
two with respect to damages was unjustifiable.2 42
Second, the effects of imposing exemplary damages would confound the
goals of the 1934 Act.2 43 The burden of such an award against a publicly
held corporation would fall on innocent shareholders. 2 " In addition, com-
pensatory awards granted through class actions or derivative suits already
provide adequate incentive to sue.245 Moreover, the availability of such ac-
tions, as well as criminal sanctions under the 1934 Act, fulfill the deterrent
purposes that punitive damages serve in other contexts. 24 6 Therefore, be-
cause the 1934 Act effectuates the purposes of exemplary awards without
resort to punitive damages, and because such awards would harm some
shareholders in attempting to protect others, the court considered punitive
damages neither desirable nor necessary to carry out the 1934 Act's
purposes.24 7
In Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 2 4 8 the same court prohibited pu-
nitive damage awards under a cause of action implied from section 17 of the
Securities Act. The court analyzed the question in terms of the function
punitive damages might serve in enforcing the Securities Act.2 49
First, the court found additional sanctions unnecessary for effective en-
238. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
239. Id. at 303.
240. Id. at 302 n.17. The legislative history cited by the court reads: "This subsection
reserves rights and remedies existing outside of those provided in the [1934] Act, but limits the
total amount recoverable to the amount of actual damages." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 28 (1934).







248. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
249. Id. at 1284.
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forcement of the Securities Act.250 As in Green, the court catalogued the
"arsenal of weapons" available to plaintiffs seeking to enforce their statutory
rights.251 Considering the powerful deterrents that criminal sanctions, com-
pensatory awards, and class actions supply, the added deterrence provided
by punitive damage awards would not justify imposition of "potentially awe-
some injuries" on the offending party.25 2 Second, the court expressed con-
cern about its inability to restrict punitive awards in future causes of action
arising from the same conduct.2 53 Finally, permitting punitive damages
would create an "unfortunate dichotomy" between the two federal securities
acts.254 Such an approach would preclude courts from treating them as a
''single comprehensive scheme of regulation" and would result in providing
one remedy to injured buyers and another, lesser remedy to injured
sellers.2 5
Taken together, Globus and Green forcefully articulate a rationale for de-
nying exemplary awards for violation of either of the federal securities acts.
Although Globus reserved the question of whether section 28(a) prohibits
"punitive damages in a pendent common law fraud claim joined to an action
based on the 1934 Act, '256 the Second Circuit provided a negative response
to that query in Flaks v. Koegel.2 .7
In Flaks, the plaintiff joined claims under the Securities Act and the 1934
Act with causes of action under New York common law.258 In summarily
holding exemplary damages recoverable on common law claims in such a
context, the court relied heavily on commentary and cases outside of the
Second Circuit.2 59 Of the cases relied upon, Young v. Taylor2 offers the
most detailed analysis of section 28(a)'s effect on pendent state claims.
Young involved joinder of a federal claim under the 1934 Act with state
common law and blue sky allegations.261 The court construed section 28(a)
to operate both as a savings clause preserving rights and remedies under
state law, as well as a ceiling limiting the maximum amount of damages




254. Id. at 1286.
255. Id. Because "the 1934 Act is the only basis upon which a defrauded seller of securities
could obtain relief," a rule allowing punitive damages for violation of the Securities Act would
grant buyers punitive damages, but, considering its holding in Green, deny it to sellers. Id.
256. Id. at 1286 n.ll.
257. 504 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974).
258. Id at 704.
259. Id. 706-07.
260. 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972).
261. Id. at 1331.
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allowable.26 2 Thus, while allowing a claimant to "use any combination of
non-statutory and statutory remedies . . .[under section 28(a)] he is not
allowed more than the maximum amount recoverable" under any one of
them.26 3
Courts generally have followed the interpretation given section 28(a) in
Flaks and Young.2  No court has prohibited punitive damages on pendent
state claims by virtue of the federal securities acts' operation.265 It is there-
fore apparent that neither section 28(a) nor a more general federal policy
deriving from the federal securities laws operate to preclude punitive dam-
ages in pendent state claims. Thus, because no federal policy prohibits
courts from awarding punitive damages on pendent claims, no "clear and
express exclusions" exist that are sufficient to preclude granting such awards
in arbitration.
The Green court's concerns about bankrupting corporations to the detri-
ment of innocent shareholders lack sufficient foundation in many contexts.
Indeed, its concern for innocent shareholders appears misplaced in corpora-
tions that are not publicly-held.2 66 Similarly, with respect to causes of ac-
tion under the 1934 Act, where the defendant often is not affiliated with the
issuer, the Green court's concerns about innocent shareholders are not rele-
vant. Furthermore, because arbitral panels are less likely than juries to
award punitive damages, the perceived dangers in vesting arbitrators with
this authority is less threatening.2 67 Moreover, the FAA authorizes judicial
review to vacate improper arbitration awards, including those granted in
"manifest disregard" of the law.26 8 In any event, arbitrators could take
these concerns into account. 269 Finally, even assuming that punitive damage
awards would violate the policies underlying the federal securities acts in
some situations, such potential provides little justification for an absolute
262. Id. at 1338.
263. Id.
264. See 5C A. JACOBS, supra note 12, § 260.03[e] (citing cases and commentary).
265. Id.
266. See Note, Securities Regulation-Damages-The Possibility of Punitive Damages as a
Remedy for a Violation of Rule lob-5, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1608, 1624 (1970).
267. Robbins, supra note 64, at 13. "Many brokerage firms do not discourage a panel from
entertaining punitive damage claims because they are confident that sophisticated arbitrators
will be able to see through emotional arguments unsupported by facts." Id. Further, "[a]s a
general rule, arbitrators with the power to award punitive damages will not be as inclined to
award them as a jury would be." Id. (quoting Phillip J. Hoblin, Jr., general counsel to Shear-
son Lehman Bros.); D. ROBBINS, RESOLVING SECURITIES DISPUTES-ARBITRATION AND
LITIGATION 348 (1986).
268. See supra note 25.
269. Indeed, should the securities industry adopt the SEC proposal to provide instruction





III. CONSEQUENCES OF AN ABSOLUTE RULE
An absolute rule denying arbitrators authority to award punitive damages
in securities disputes would undermine the purposes of the FAA. Though
the FAA sanctions such a result where congressional intent clearly com-
mands,271 the legislative history of the securities acts does not demonstrate
this intention with respect to punitive damages.272 Indeed, an absolute rule
would reward egregious misconduct, thereby undermining the protection
provided investors and impairing the efficiency of the securities markets.27 3
A. Congressional Intent and Supreme Court Precedent
Congress' preeminent motivation in enacting the FAA was to mandate
enforcement of valid arbitration provisions .2 4 The primary justification for
providing private parties with the option to arbitrate, enforceable through
the FAA, inheres in the speed and efficiency yielded by arbitral dispute
resolution.275
Courts adhering to state public policy prohibitions against punitive dam-
age awards in arbitration, against arguably definitive Supreme Court prece-
dent,276 attempt to impose such prohibitions both before and after arbitral
disposition of the claim. Before arbitration, a federal district court might
deny a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the FAA, due
to the presence of a prayer for punitive relief. This kind of denial would
clearly conflict with congressional intent and Supreme Court interpretation
thereof.277 In addition, denial would withhold the practical benefits of arbi-
tration from the party seeking enforcement and would therefore conflict
with the secondary purposes of the FAA.
As an alternative, federal court might impose a punitive damage prohibi-
tion after the fact by vacating the punitive portion of the award.278 How-
270. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 362 (N.D.
Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
271. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2338 (1987).
272. See supra note 207.
273. See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 332 (5th Cir. 1981).
274. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
275. Id. at 220.
276. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); see also Hirshman, supra note 30,
at 1360-63.
277. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337 (1987). "The Arbi-
tration Act thus establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration ... requiring that we rigor-
ously enforce agreements to arbitrate." Id. (citations omitted).
278. See supra note 25.
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ever, the same conflict would arise with the purposes of the FAA when a
court issues an order denying a motion compelling arbitration. In addition,
such a practice might expand the standard of review beyond that contem-
plated by either the FAA or Supreme Court interpretations thereof.279
Although section 10(d) of the FAA does provide for an award to be vacated
if the arbitrators exceed their powers,2"' the Supreme Court previously held
that arbitrators may consider tort claims.2"' Given this interpretation, deny-
ing arbitrators authority to provide relief commensurate with the cause of
action before them would not only be "anamolous,"' 2 2 but would render
arbitration less effective than courts in protecting claimants' rights.2 83 Thus,
denying such authority to arbitrators would defy congressional intent and
undermine Supreme Court precedent.
To defeat application of the FAA, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 284 required a showing of congres-
sional intent to exempt a given claim from the Act's application.2 85 The
federal securities acts evidence no such intent with respect to pendent claims
for punitive relief.28 6 On the contrary, section 28(a) of the 1934 Act ex-
presses congressional respect for existing state claims and remedies by ex-
plicitly providing for their preservation. 2 7 Thus, refusing to preserve
punitive remedies available under state law would not only confound the
purposes of the FAA, but would directly contravene the express mandate of
the 1934 Act.
B. Policies Underlying Punitive Remedies
A rule enforcing an arbitration clause, but prohibiting arbitrators from
considering punitive damage claims, would also frustrate the policies under-
lying and purposes served by punitive damage awards. 28 s Automatic immu-
nity from punishment would encourage intentional wrongdoing by
increasing its profitability.28 9
Denying arbitrators authority to consider punitive damage claims would
279. Id.
280. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982).
281. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1967).
282. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 362, aff'd,
776 F.2d 269 (11 th Cir. 1985).
283. See supra note 156.
284. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
285. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
286. See supra text accompanying note 265.
287. See supra text accompanying note 263.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 158-61.
289. See supra note 157.
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eviscerate the deterrent, penal, and incentive functions provided by such
awards and would allow defendants engaging in outrageous conduct to es-
cape otherwise applicable penalties.2 90 Thus, rather than providing a forum
equally protective of parties' rights, arbitration might degenerate into a ha-
ven for the intentional tortfeasor and a "trap for the unwary." 29'
C. Informing Private Expectations
In addition to conflicting with the FAA and the 1934 Act, an absolute
denial of punitive damages in arbitration would frustrate parties' expecta-
tions in signing an arbitration contract. Judge Gabrielli's dissent in Garrity
v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.292 and the majority opinion in Willoughby Roofing &
Supply Co. v. Kajima International, Inc. 293 describe how parties' rights
under the FAA would suffer from an absolute denial of punitive damages in
arbitration. First, denial of arbitration due to the existence of a punitive
damage claim would interfere with the parties' freedom to contractually de-
termine the manner of resolving future disputes. Precluding arbitration
would not only entail disregarding their contractual rights, but the cost sav-
ings and expedition parties seek in submitting a claim to arbitration would
disappear. Although Judge Gabrielli would approve of a result "where the
public interest clearly supercedes," he found that punitive damage awards do
not sufficiently implicate such interests.294
The majority in Willoughby also stressed the importance of contractual
considerations in determining whether arbitrators possessed the authority to
award punitive damages.29 Where an arbitration clause places no limits on
the remedial authority of the tribunal, federal policy prohibits courts from
implying them.296 Indeed, failure to broadly construe arbitration clauses in
favor of granting arbitrators expansive remedial authority would undermine
the FAA by enforcing fewer arbitration agreements. Further, denial of arbi-
tration may deprive one party of the benefit of his bargain. Assuming that
inclusion of an arbitration provision and the prospect of enjoying the benefits
of arbitrating future disputes influenced an individual's decision to enter into
an agreement, that individual would lose the benefit of his bargain and be-
come bound to an arrangement he did not contemplate.
290. See Robbins, supra note 64, at 13-14.
291. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 353 N.E.2d 793, 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d
831, 835 (1976) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 360-65, 353 N.E.2d at 797-800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 835-38 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
293. 598 F. Supp. 353, 353 (1984), aff'd. 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
294. Garrity. 40 N.Y.2d at 365, 353 N.E.2d at 800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202.
296. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
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Second, a policy absolutely denying access to arbitration for parties seek-
ing punitive damages would decrease the value of arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism generally. Such a policy would necessarily reduce the
number and types of claims resolvable through arbitration, in contravention
of federal policy and Supreme Court precedent. Any given case might even
"require two trials-one before the arbitrator and then a separate judicial
trial on essentially the same facts."29 7 Thus, in addition to undermining the
FAA's primary purpose of enforcing valid arbitration provisions, a Garrity-
type prohibition would eliminate the "chief advantages and purposes of arbi-
tration-to resolve congestion in the courts and to achieve a quick, inexpen-
sive and binding resolution of all disputes that arise between parties to an
agreement. ,
2 98
Because the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the availability of punitive
relief for pendent state claims in securities arbitration, a real possibility exists
that a securities purchaser may, in signing an arbitration contract, surrender
his right to pursue exemplary damages. Indeed, Garrity2 9 9 would seem to
portend this result and at least one federal court has followed its mandate. 3"
Therefore, absent statutory or judicial assurance, the SEC should step for-
ward and alert claimants of the possible implications of agreeing to arbitrate
future securities disputes.3 °1
Indeed, the SEC has acted preemptively to protect investors in the past.
The SEC's recently abandoned requirement of notice that claims brought
under the Securities Act may be nonarbitrable 30 2 reflected similar con-
cerns.3" 3 In addition, its recent proposal to improve securities arbitration
procedures arose from its responsibility to ensure the fairness of and public
confidence in arbitral proceedings.3" Moreover, the SEC has the authority
297. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 364 (citations omitted).
298. Id.
299. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1976).
300. Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D. I11.
1981).
301. See Shell, supra note 4, at 14, col. I ("the SEC and SICA [Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration] should see to it that arbitration is explained rather than sneaked by
customers").
302. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-2-2 (1982) (rescinded by 52 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (1987)).
303. 52 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (1987). After noting that the Supreme Court's decision in McMa-
hon made predispute arbitration agreements enforceable with respect to 1934 Act claims, the
SEC found that "notice and public procedures are unnecessary in the public interest because
Rule 15c-2-2 is no longer appropriate in light of case law developments." Id at 39,217. Rule
15c-2-2 had codified the SEC's "longstanding view" that clauses purporting to bind customers
to arbitration were inconsistent with the deceptive practice prohibitions of § 10(b) and § 15(c)
of the 1934 Act. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,406 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-2-2 (1986)).
304. See SEC Letter, supra note 2, 1.
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under section 19(c) of the 1934 Act3 °5 to require SROs to adopt its
proposal.30 6
A rule requiring member firms to provide notice to customers of the possi-
bility that, in agreeing to arbitrate, they may forfeit the possibility of recov-
ering punitive damages, would serve the purpose of the securities acts by
promoting fairness and equalizing the negotiating positions of customers and
broker-dealers.3"7 Furthermore, it would effectuate the FAA's purposes by
encouraging specification of the nature of the authority granted to arbitra-
tors by the agreement. Customers could then either bargain for explicit lan-
guage allowing arbitrators to consider punitive damage claims, or make a
fully informed decision to the contrary.
Alternatively, the SEC could propose amendments to SRO rules that
would explicitly state what types of remedies arbitrators may grant.30 8 Un-
like other industry-specific arbitration rules,3 °9 the Code is silent on the
types of awards available to parties to an arbitral proceeding. 310 Informing
investors of available remedies would decrease the uncertainty with which
even knowledgeable investors approach a decision to accept a predispute ar-
bitration provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
No explicit legislative or United States Supreme Court judicial direction
exists with respect to the availability, in arbitration, of punitive relief on state
claims joined with allegations of violations of federal securities laws. Recent
Supreme Court decisions, however, clarify the breadth of the FAA and artic-
ulate the Court's view of the adequacy of securities arbitration in protecting
claimants' statutory rights.311 Thus, state-based impediments do not suffice
to deny arbitration or to restrict the authority of arbitrators to flexibly fash-
ion appropriate remedies.31 2
Similarly, the Court's requirement that exceptions from application of the
305. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982).
306. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2341 (1987). "In short,
the Commission has broad authority to ... mandate the adoption of any rules it deems neces-
sary to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights." Id. (emphasis
added).
307. See Sterk, supra note 102, at 517-18; see also Shell, supra note 4, at 14, col. 1; supra
note 116.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 304-06.
309. See supra note 165.
310. Id.
311. See supra notes 156.
312. See Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1360-63.
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FAA rest on manifest congressional intent 313 cannot be met with respect to
claims arising under either the federal securities laws or state claims ap-
pended thereto.3 4 Indeed, explicit statutory language in the 1934 Act man-
dates preservation of state-based remedies.31 5 Thus, federal statutory
obstacles to awarding punitive damages in arbitration are also absent.
Given the absence of federal statutory impediments to awarding punitive
damages in securities arbitration, federal policy concerns provide the final
possible rationale for denying punitive damages on pendent state claims. As-
suming that mere policy concerns justify interference with the powerful stat-
utory mandate of the FAA, those concerns raised in the context of securities
arbitration should not warrant denying enforcement of otherwise valid arbi-
tration provisions. First, most federal policy concerns remain either un-
founded or alleviable through instruction of the arbitration panels.31 6
Indeed, the Supreme Court has twice found the presence of punitive sanc-
tions in federal statutes insufficient to preclude compelled arbitration of
claims based upon those statutes.31 7 Second, to the degree that arbitrators
are less likely than jurors to grant punitive relief, claimants in arbitration
would already surrender remedies available in court-even if arbitrators re-
ceived explicit authorization to award punitive damages.3a 8 Moreover, dis-
allowing punitive remedies in arbitration would frustrate the investor-
protection policy of the federal securities laws by rewarding intentional
wrongdoing and reducing the effectiveness of private enforcement of the fed-
eral securities laws. Finally, denial of punitive damages in securities arbitra-
tion would make arbitration a refuge for intentional tortfeasors, rather than
an efficient and potentially equitable method of dispute resolution.
Thomas J. Kenny
313. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2338 (1987).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 258-70.
315. Id.
316. See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 110.
318. See supra note 267.
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